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One of the biggest obstacles to Ethiopia benefiting from the EPRDF’s 
devolutionary policies does not lie, as the government’s actions seem 
to suggest, with Amhara chauvinists wanting to resurrect a past ethnic 
hegemony which is surely buried, but with the Front’s contumacious 
implementation of the policy, and its effort to control virtually every 
facet of the political process.2
In the 1990s in Africa, two sharply contrasting models of state-society 
relations and the role of ethnicity in national affairs have emerged.3 
The first is the unitary dispensation that rejects the ethnic classification 
of its citizens while cognizant of the ill effects of a race and ethnic-
based apartheid order. The African National Congress (ANC) and its 
allies in South Africa opted for a strategy they thought would ensure 
the country’s political and administrative restructuring but would not 
perpetuate sectarian ethnic identity at the expense of citizenship.4 Con-
sequently, the post-apartheid regional administrative structure and 
boundaries are not based on ethnicity. Further, the populations in these 
regions elect their provincial councils, and have gained some degree of 
fiscal autonomy, although South Africa remains a unitary state. A key 
manifestation of the system’s competitiveness is the fact that opposi-
tion parties have governed two of the wealthiest and most populous 
regions for most of the past decade and the ANC has been unable to 
dislodge them until the most recent election in 2004.5 Although the 
ANC won the most votes in Kwa Zulu–Natal and the Western Cape, 
it lacks a majority in these provincial councils to unilaterally form 
regional administrations. This openness of the political process has 
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made possible a significant degree of regional autonomy in a unitary 
system.
The second model is Ethiopia’s ethnically based federal order. This 
model anchors citizenship in the soil of ethnic belonging. Advocates of 
this framework claimed that dividing the country into ethnic regions 
would recognize the country’s primordial reality and bring past injus-
tice to a rapid end:
Sometimes, people in Africa feel that they can wish away ethnic differ-
ence. Experience in Rwanda has taught us this is not the case. Experience 
in Liberia has taught us that this is not the case. What we are trying to 
do in Ethiopia is to recognize that ethnic differences are part of life in 
Africa, and try to deal with them in a rational manner. Rather than hide 
the fact that we have ethnic difference, we are saying people should 
express it freely. That, I think, pre-empts the type of implosion we’ve 
had in Rwanda.6
The intent of the Ethiopian approach has been to give greater auton-
omy to ethnic communities to manage their affairs.7 The country’s 
constitution sanctions decentralized and autonomous regional admin-
istrations; however, political praxis has been at odds with these prin-
ciples.
Ethiopia’s ethnic regions generate continuing controversy regard-
ing their long-term effects on the country’s integrity. At one extreme, 
some predict that the centrifugal dynamics of Ethiopia’s exclusive sub-
national identities will lead to the country’s disintegration, particularly 
since the new constitution guarantees the right to self-determination 
up to secession. Proponents of this thesis cite the former Soviet Union 
as a model of what happens when central government is weakened 
in previously authoritarian and ethnically divided societies.8 Second, 
supporters of the ethnically based dispensation note that the new 
federalism is a novel departure for Ethiopia that cannot be reversed 
despite teething problems.9 Third, other critics claim that the dominant 
party at the center has reneged on its democratic promise by illegally 
subverting free ethnic political mobilization.10
All three claims have some merit. An implosion of the federal sys-
tem could become a reality if national leaders and regional authorities 
are unable to produce a legitimate political and economic system that 
matches the aspirations of different communities. It is also the case that 
the new order has introduced the limited freedoms that most Ethio-
pians already enjoy. Finally, evidence suggests that those in power in 
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Addis Ababa harass ethnic organizations in the regions that have cen-
trist, democratic, or independence agendas.11
Other important aspects of the debate indicate that the dominant 
political party and economic practice will determine the viability of 
ethnic federalism.12 The preeminent party, the Tigray People’s Libera-
tion Front (TPLF), and its affiliate, the Ethiopian People’s Revolution-
ary Democratic Front (EPRDF), have a strategic role in determining the 
longevity, character, and vitality of a federated Ethiopia. The govern-
ing party’s accomplishments are portrayed in one of two ways. Some 
describe the TPLF as liberating and democratizing.13 Others paint a 
picture of a conniving, but ultimately Tigray-dominated system.14 
These studies rarely examine the internal dynamics of ethnic regions to 
assess the actual balance of power between the center and the regions. 
Two of the few such attempts are Markakis’ sketchy research note and 
Khalief and Martin’s decidedly uncritical presentation of the Somali 
case.15
Drawing on material from the Somali Region, this article posits 
that the post-1991 dispensation opened new opportunities initially, but 
that the governing party’s manipulation of internal regional politics 
derailed the promise of an autonomous and legitimate local adminis-
tration that could remedy past ailments. The TPLF/EPRDF’s capacity 
to manage regional authorities depends on the quality and legitimacy 
of local leadership and the political coherence of provincial communi-
ties. Thus, the best prospect for autonomous regions within the Ethio-
pian federation lies in a collaboration between regional leadership that 
is accountable to local people and a national authority that balances 
its interests with those of the federation. Conversely, the prospects for 
viable and autonomous regions dim when the regime at the center is 
domineering and the regional authority is ill equipped.
This essay examines the political dynamics generated by Ethiopia’s 
division into ethnic regions. Specifically, it demonstrates that the central 
government’s attempts to tightly control regional political processes 
undermine the essence of regional self-rule that the federal constitu-
tion mandates. Making the situation more precarious, inept regional 
elites waste opportunities to enhance regional autonomy. The evidence 
has been gathered from the Somali Region (Region 5) since 1995 and 
mainly consists of individual and group interviews. The names of all 
the sources are withheld to ensure their personal safety. Each source is 
numbered in the text.16
Abdi Ismail Samatar
47
The rest of the article consists of three parts. Part one sketches the 
forces involved in the initiation of Ethiopia’s new federal system. It 
underscores the weakness of regional parties that were invited to the 
national conference that produced the federal structure. The determi-
nation and ability of the TPLF to ignore many of the demands of major 
regional parties, such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), created 
a strong perception from the start that regional authorities served at 
the pleasure of the dominant party. The second section assesses politi-
cal developments in Region 5 since the collapse of the old regime. It 
briefly summarizes the history of the region’s liberation struggle and 
its relations with the Somali Republic, and highlights how the Somali 
military government (1969–91) subjugated the population’s desire for 
liberation to its own agenda. The military regime’s domination of the 
liberation movement undermined the capacity of the local population 
to craft a coherent regional project. This analysis is followed by an 
examination of the establishment of the Somali Region in 1991 and of 
the role federal authorities played in determining which Somali party 
led the regional administration. Initially, the Ogaden National Libera-
tion Front (ONLF)17 became the only regional party openly opposed 
to the federal agenda to direct a new administration. However, the 
rule of the ONLF did not endure and the Ethiopian Somali Demo-
cratic League (ESDL) replaced it in the 1995 regional election. At this 
point, the Somali Region had the most competitive regional elections 
in Ethiopia. Despite this exceptional democratic transfer of power, the 
federal authorities “indirectly” appointed the region’s president, and 
the new ruling party made important changes in the way the region 
was administered. The federal authorities exploited internal party con-
flict and abruptly terminated the party’s tenure. Furthermore, the fed-
eral authorities not only forced a merger of the two Somali parties and 
created a new one but their representatives moreover managed and 
directed the “congress” that established the new party. In the process, 
they “helped” appoint the new regional president. The imposed unifi-
cation of the two Somali parties terminated spirited electoral competi-
tion in the region. These developments brought political practice in the 
region into line with the rest of the country. The final section reflects 
upon the consequences of fractious and inept local leadership and 
excessive federal intervention for regional autonomy and local democ-
racy.
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II. Regional Authority and the New Federation
The TPLF’s decision to use ethnicity as way to mobilize first the Tigray 
population,18 and second, other nationalities, against the brutal mili-
tary regime was an expedient and strategic decision, particularly given 
the Amhara colonization of the state. Having defeated the military 
oligarchy in its home territory by 1988, TPLF realized that it could not 
march to the national capital and impose a Tigray regime in place of 
the Amhara. Consequently, it formed the Ethiopian People’s Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which included junior partners 
from Amhara, Oromo, and other national groups. Many EPRDF mem-
bers, particularly the Oromos (from the Oromo People’s Democratic 
Organization or OPDP) were prisoners of war in the TPLF camps. 
Once it captured the capital in 1991, the TPLF-led EPRDF convened a 
national conference. Those invited to the conference belonged to ethni-
cally based movements, some of which had only recently formed.19 
The EPRDF’s most important new ally was the independent and pop-
ular OLF, representing the largest ethnic group. Despite the collage 
of ethnic participants in the conference, the military victors clearly 
controlled the conference’s agenda.20 However, the collaboration of 
autonomous groups, such as the OLF, enhanced EPRDF’s credibility. 
The conference produced a national charter that laid the groundwork 
for the to-be-constituted Ethiopian federation. The transitional govern-
ment that was then formed marched to EPRDF’s tune, with the TPLF as 
its political and military leader.
The first major rift between the EPRDF and the autonomous 
national liberation movement, the OLF, became public in 1992.21 The 
OLF claimed that EPRDF troops harassed and intimidated its people, 
and the dominant party’s refusal to postpone the 1992 election led the 
OLF to renounce the coalition.22 The OLF alleged that the election was 
rigged in favor of the dominant party and its supplicant Oromo ally, 
the OPDO.23 The OLF withdrew from the transitional government. 
Shortly thereafter, the Tigray (TPLF) troops humiliated the OLF by 
capturing 20,000 of its soldiers in their camp. The defeat of the OLF 
signaled that the victor was not going to be detracted from turning 
its agenda into the national program. Many informed people viewed 
the electoral “victory” of the EPRDF/OPDO in Oromia in 1992 and the 
harassment and persecution of the OLF as a bad omen for the constitu-
tionally sanctioned federalism anchored in autonomous regions.24
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The departure of the OLF meant the removal of the largest and most 
popular party from the political scene. Political organizations that 
were junior partners in the EPRDF coalition came to power in most of 
the country after the 1992 regional elections. The Somali Region was 
an exception, since the ONLF formed the first regional authority. The 
ONLF was neither a member of the EPRDF coalition nor an ally of 
the ruling party. This party refused to participate in the dialogue that 
produced the transitional charter. Instead, it advocated the immediate 
secession of the Somali Region from Ethiopia. This party remained 
in power for a brief period. The Somali People’s Democratic League 
(SPDL), a friend of the EPRDF, replaced it in 1995. The League was, 
in turn, displaced by the Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP) in 
1998. A narrative of the political history of the Somali Region since 
1991 shows the relative roles of ethnic political parties and the ruling 
party in Ethiopian federalism.
III. Politics in Somali Ethiopia since 1991
Analysts often point to the TPLF’s organizational and leadership skills 
and its cadres’ discipline as a national asset.25 The future role of other 
ethnically based parties in the evolution of the Ethiopian polity requires 
an assessment of the quality of these parties and their legitimacy. 
Establishing an ethnic federation acceptable to the various groups will 
require representative parties from all communities to broker the nec-
essary political and economic compromises. In an ideal world, ethnic 
equals will come together to create a federation on a mutual basis. But 
Ethiopia is not an ideal context. As an ethnic liberation movement with 
national leadership ambitions that defeated the old regime, the TPLF 
resolved to remake Ethiopia under its tutelage. If other ethnic libera-
tion movements had significantly helped defeat the military dictator-
ship, then the nature of the post-Derg dispensation might not have 
been so lopsided. The TPLF movement introduced a democratically 
promising element into Ethiopia’s political milieu. However, those mil-
itarily weak movements that had democratic aspirations were faced 
with a stark choice: stay in the game, within circumscribed limits, and 
try to push the democratic agenda from within or retreat to the bush 
and engage in a liberation war. The immediate choice made by signifi-
cant elements of the Somali community to play by the TPLF rules was 
the wise one. The alternative that ONLF advocated would have been 
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catastrophic, as it would have thrust an unprepared Somali population 
into war with Ethiopia’s new regime.
A. Liberation Politics in Somali Ethiopia
A brief explanation of the history of the Somali Ethiopian Liberation 
movement will shed light on the limiting conditions the Somali com-
munity has faced in the post-1991 period. The first organized libera-
tion movement in the Somali territory under Ethiopian jurisdiction, 
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), came into existence a 
few years after Somalia gained its independence in 1960.26 The Somali 
Republic’s Constitution sanctioned liberation of Somali territories in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland. This essentially embedded 
these liberation movements in inter-state relations and, more centrally, 
in Somali regime politics. The liberation movement in Somali Ethio-
pia reached it zenith in 1977–78, when the military government in 
Mogadishu committed its forces to “assist” the struggle. The liberation 
movement had no autonomy from the Somali national army in this 
effort. Nonetheless, the Somali Ethiopian population supported the 
war despite the stranglehold. Somali successes were temporary once 
the Soviet, Cuban, and Yemeni contingents intervened and helped 
Ethiopian troops beat the Somali army. This defeat was catastrophic for 
Somalia and the liberation movement. In Somalia an armed political 
power struggle among the elite ensued, culminating in the state’s col-
lapse and in the country’s disintegration in 1991.
During the interim period, 1978–91, the liberation movement lost 
its autonomy because the Somali military regime used the liberation 
movement for its own purposes, as many movement leaders became 
henchmen of the new order. Those who disagreed with the tactics of 
the regime were forced to flee the country; the unlucky individuals 
rotted in jail. This treatment caused the movement to lose its grass-
roots identity and become a sycophant of the military rulers.27 The col-
lapse of the state and the subsequent fragmentation of Somali society 
into warlord territories, along with the rise of sectarian politics, had 
dire effects on Somali Ethiopian politics. Although Somalis contributed 
significantly to the weakening of the Mengistu regime, the liberation 
movement was politically and militarily a spent force in 1991. Many 
Somali Ethiopians who had moved to Somalia since the early 1960s 
returned to Ethiopia after May 1991. Some of these were senior military 
leaders and political entrepreneurs, steeped in sectarian elite games.
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B. Chaotic Transition: Disorganized Elite and Federal Interventions
The viability of an autonomous Somali Region in the new federation 
depended on the interplay between a fractured Somali elite and TPLF 
forces. This section demonstrates how disorganized Somali leadership 
created opportunities for federal authorities to determine which party 
ruled the region. The willingness of federal authorities to intercede in 
local affairs signaled the problematic nature of “regional autonomy” in 
Ethiopia. Regional autonomy should mean that local people are free to 
choose representatives that are accountable to them.
Most Somalis everywhere rejoiced over the collapse of the Mengistu 
government, particularly since former Somali regimes had supported 
the TPLF. But some Somali Ethiopians had expectations contrary to 
the designs of the TPLF. As TPLF troops gained control of the country, 
the ONLF warned that Tigray troops should not cross into Somali ter-
ritory. The ONLF threatened war in the Somali territory if its warning 
was not heeded. Young men representing the ONLF came to Addis 
Ababa, and the Sudanese government began to mediate an agreement 
between the ONLF and the EPRDF. The ONLF representatives refused 
to adopt EPRDF’s political scheme. Once EPRDF leaders understood 
their position, it began to search for other Somali groups. The EPRDF 
announced that people could form their own political parties. Before 
long, the names of a dozen political parties appeared, supposedly rep-
resenting various opinions. In the absence of an authentic liberation 
movement representing the Somali community, the EPRDF sent for 
the remnants of the WSLF, languishing in Mogadishu. These indi-
viduals were brought to Addis Ababa. The EPRDF proceeded with its 
agenda and allocated four seats in the national conference to Somali 
groups,28 except for the ONLF. The WSLF leaders, who received two 
seats, wanted Somali representatives in the national conference to be 
inclusive of all Somali groups; consequently, they decided to give one 
of their seats to the ONLF.29
From the first encounter between the Somalis and the EPRDF, three 
things became apparent. First, the EPRDF unilaterally decided how 
many national conference representatives each participating ethnic 
group would have. These allocations were based on estimates of the 
relative sizes of different population groups in the country. Second, 
the EPRDF decided which Somalis would participate in the confer-
ence. The ONLF’s initial exclusion from the participant list implied that 
ethnic communities might not be free to choose their representatives. 
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Third, the Somali Region was going to suffer from social fragmenta-
tion in the absence of a disciplined, institutionalized, and rooted lib-
eration movement. The 1992 regional parliamentary election did not 
change the political landscape. There were simply no organized and 
established political parties that could compete with one another on 
the basis of a political program. From the 37 Somali constituencies, 
111 individuals were elected. The ONLF, as a nominal political party, 
claimed the largest number of representatives. The newly elected rep-
resentatives attended a seminar in Dire Dawa, the presumed capital of 
the Somali Region, organized by the transitional government. Accord-
ing to numerous informants, Somali deputies paid scant attention to 
the conference proceedings but concentrated on lobbying for posts in 
Ethiopia’s first Somali regional government.
By counting all people of Ogadeni genealogical origin as the party’s 
“natural members,” the ONLF wrongly assumed it had a sufficient 
majority in the assembly to form the new government. Unfortunately 
for the ONLF, many elected officials of Ogadeni descent did not 
belong to this party nor share its clanist agenda. The WSLF had the 
second largest group of elected members in the regional parliament. 
As the parliament proceeded to elect government officials from its 
ranks, active campaigning began for the executive committee posts: 
regional president, vice-president, and secretary. Abdillahi Mohamed 
Saadi organized his 33 genealogical groups within ONLF and gained 
their support for his candidacy for president. Since Saadi was not the 
ONLF’s official presidential candidate, his candidacy exposed the par-
ty’s lack of internal coherence, discipline, and election procedures.
Meanwhile, other groups in the regional parliament were becom-
ing alarmed by the ONLF’s claim of being the majority party. Also 
concerned about the ONLF’s sectarian agenda (excluding all Somali 
groups except those of Ogadeni descent) and internal turmoil, these 
other groups began to rally around an agenda inclusive of all Somali 
groups. They nominated Sh. Abdi Nasir, an Ogadeni who strongly sup-
ported an inclusive political agenda, for the presidency of the region. 
Professor Abdillahi and Eid Dahir were their candidates for vice presi-
dent and secretary. Those nominated for the nineteen openings for the 
Executive Committee of Parliament also represented a broad cross-
section of the population. This inclusive approach forced the ONLF to 
accept Saadi’s presidential candidacy rather than risk a split within its 
ranks and thus the chance to control the regional government.
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At this point, the inclusive Somali group suspected that the ONLF 
was communicating with EPRDF authorities in Addis Ababa.30 They 
believed that the ONLF complained to the EPRDF authorities that 
about eleven members of the regional parliament, who did not have 
their approval and represented areas in which Somalis and Oromos 
were competing for office, were participants in the deliberations. For 
whatever reason, the EPRDF government intervened in local par-
liamentary matters and expelled eleven members from the regional 
parliament. These changes sealed the ONLF’s victory in forming the 
government, and Saadi was elected regional president.
The next major items on the parliament’s agenda were the region’s 
official name, its flag, and the formal designation of Somali Ethiopia’s 
capital city. The two most contentious agenda items were the identi-
fication of the capital city and the region’s name. The ONLF strongly 
argued for adopting “Ogaden” as the region’s name. This motion was 
defeated, and the name “Somali Region” won approval. Once the 
debate on the selection of the regional capital began, the ONLF leaders 
brought another faxed message from the federal authorities instructing 
the Somali parliament to choose a town other than Dire Dawa, since 
the Oromos also claim Dire Dawa as their city. The ONLF supported 
the EPRDF’s position and proposed Godey, a small and remote town in 
the far reaches of the region, as the capital. An emergency meeting was 
called to consider Godey. This proposal was approved by the central 
authorities, to the chagrin of most non-ONLF Somalis. Despite these 
problems, this foundational meeting held in Dire Dawa resulted in the 
first major Somali public celebration in Ethiopian history.31
The newly elected Somali leaders went to Addis Ababa to be intro-
duced to Ethiopia’s transitional government. They met then-President 
Zenawi, Prime Minister Layne, and the Somali Minister in the cen-
tral government, Abdimajid Hussein.32 The transitional government 
granted the Somali leaders a budget of six million Birr to finance their 
immediate agenda. The three Somali leaders remained in Addis Ababa 
despite the enormous and urgent duty of forming a functional regional 
and local administration. The ONLF administration took another four 
months to appoint regional departmental heads and district admin-
istrators. Such a lackadaisical attitude among its leaders boded ill for 
the region’s viability. Two events illustrate this point. First, rather than 
seeking professional advice about how to form a viable regional admin-
istration, they merely copied the structure of the central government. 
The only posts left out were uniquely federal departments, such as 
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Foreign Affairs and Defense. Second, the three senior leaders and some 
members of the parliament’s executive committee divided the six mil-
lion Birr among themselves to spend in the following ways. The presi-
dent and the secretary purchased vehicles with some of the money. The 
vice-president allocated some money for use in areas in which Somalis 
and Oromos were competing for office. When the executive commit-
tee members complained about being left out of the spoils, they were 
given a share of the funds to purchase chairs and tables. These actions 
were taken without parliamentary approval and without recording the 
expenses.33
This inappropriate managerial approach displeased some execu-
tive committee members, who complained to the federal authorities. 
They were told to convene their parliament and sort out their differ-
ences with the regional administration. The group heeded this advice, 
returned to Godey, and requested an urgent meeting of parliament. 
Meanwhile, some ONLF members were disgusted with what they per-
ceived as systemic corruption in the regional government and called 
for its dismissal.
Parliament was called into session. The first agenda item was to for-
mulate operational rules and local laws. While debating these matters, 
disgruntled ONLF members intensified their demand for a change of 
government. Given the threat to his post from within the party’s ranks, 
Saadi, the regional president, believed that non-ONLF parliamentar-
ians were his allies. After all, they were not calling for his removal 
from office. In the meantime, a group of MPs, mostly from the Jigjiga 
zone, organized themselves as a parliamentary bloc (15 members) and 
pushed a collective “Jigjiga agenda.” The Jigjiga bloc agreed to nomi-
nate their members to official posts based on merit. The group’s cohe-
sion made it into a powerful alliance within parliament whose support 
others sought.34
In an attempt to bring down the government, thirteen appalled 
executive committee members resigned as a group. This precipitate 
action created an immediate crisis. Other executive committee mem-
bers urged parliament to replace those who resigned. At this point, 
the speaker of the national assembly, Dawit Johannes, and a Somali 
member of the assembly, Abdulaziz Ahmed, came to Godey. They told 
the regional president that he could not stay in power legally after the 
resignation of thirteen executive committee members. They urged par-
liament to re-elect or replace the members who had resigned.35
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A new campaign for executive branch posts ensued. The ONLF 
abandoned its former office bearers and nominated Abdirashid Ahmed 
as president, Professor Abdillahi as vice-president, and Abdi Illah as 
secretary. Other members of parliament formed a grouping called the 
United Zones (UZ) and nominated Hassan Gire, Abdi Illah, and Eid 
Dahir for the three posts. The latter group, whose core members were 
from the Jigjiga zone, negotiated with Abdi Illah’s kinsmen and offered 
them the vice presidency. The two parties agreed on this. However, 
this covenant fell apart as Abdi Illah reneged and attacked Eid as unfit 
for the secretary’s post. The UZ group withdrew from the agreement. 
A new executive committee was elected, much to the ONLF’s chagrin. 
In September 1993, the committee elected the UZ group ticket to form 
the new government.36
The newly elected president and his associates went to Addis Ababa 
to meet the federal authorities. Apparently, the ONLF cadre asked the 
new non-ONLF—but Ogadeni—president and his deputy to claim to 
be ONLF to boost the “Ogaden” cause. The president did this in a 
national radio interview. The secretary, Eid Dahir, contradicted him on 
the same radio program. Despite the president’s radio announcement, 
the ONLF cadre and loyalists harassed the new government in Godey.
President Hassan Jireh’s team began to appoint new administra-
tors for various posts. In a short period they appointed 77 directors of 
offices, a number that exceeded the sum of the federal government’s 
offices. The regime proceeded to appoint 261 teachers for every zone 
in the Somali Region.37 It was simply following a central government 
directive indicating that this number of teachers could be hired per 
zone. The trouble with the Somali regime’s approach was that hardly 
any of its zones, with the exception of Jigjiga and maybe two other 
places, had enough schools to absorb this many teachers. The stark-
est example of this misuse of regional resources was the deployment 
of 261 teachers to the Fiiq zone, an area with only one elementary 
school, which could use about six teachers.38 By contrast, Jigjiga—with 
53 schools, including the only senior secondary school in the Somali 
Region—received the same number of teachers. Furthermore, most of 
the newly employed teachers did not have the necessary training and 
qualifications; others were phantoms.
The ONLF was unhappy about being excluded from partaking in 
the spoils and called for a parliamentary meeting in early 1994. The UZ 
group supported this proposition, but asked that the meeting be held 
in Jigjiga. The ONLF did not like the change of venue but agreed to it 
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as long as its key concern, formal debate over regional self-determina-
tion, appeared on the agenda. The UZ realized that it could not resist 
the inclusion of this item in the debate, as that would have handed the 
ONLF a major propaganda victory. Moreover, the UZ added a point on 
the agenda that would free regional and federal authorities to fight Iti-
haad, the militant Muslim group. Most UZ members suspected that the 
ONLF and Itihaad were connected. Parliament meekly discussed the 
Itihaad item and then approved it with overwhelming support. Next 
the meeting turned its attention to self-determination.39 The delegates 
agreed to form a parliamentary committee to negotiate with the fed-
eral authorities the terms of divorce. Most regional MPs had not read 
the federal interim constitution and the procedures governing regional 
self-determination. The few who had read it led the advocates of self-
determination into a political confrontation with federal authorities by 
convincing them to form this committee.
The intense emotional nature of the parliamentary debate on self-
determination sidetracked ONLF deputies from trying to bring down 
the non-ONLF regional government. The sense of victory felt by 
supporters of immediate self-determination was short-lived, for the 
committee never went to Addis Ababa to negotiate with the federal 
authorities. However, when the federal authorities learned about the 
Somali parliament’s decision to pursue self-determination, they imme-
diately demanded that the parliamentary executive committee call an 
urgent meeting of parliament to inform members of the illegality of 
their act and to reverse it. The meeting was called, although many 
ONLF members refused to attend. The president left for Addis Ababa 
after giving his blessing to the meeting. Afterwards, key ONLF mem-
bers convinced the president that, if the parliamentary meeting con-
tinued, it would do great harm to their interests. The president faxed 
a message to the executive committee, telling them that their meeting 
was illegal.40 Furious about the president’s acts, the committee decided 
to fire him. They also accepted his deputy’s resignation when he quit in 
protest at the meeting.
The federal authorities intervened in regional political affairs for a 
second time. The prime minister’s office changed its view on the ONLF 
as the major party in the region. As parliament began to elect the third 
regional government, the federal authorities reversed their earlier deci-
sion to expel MPs from the areas that were contested by Oromos and 
Somalis. The induction of these individuals into parliament enabled the 
UZ group to elect Ugas Abdirahman and Ahmed Makahiil as president 
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and vice president, with Eid Dahir as secretary. The UZ group elected 
Abdirahman as president in late 1994, because the group thought he 
shared their inclusive political agenda. The new government decided 
to temporarily transfer the capital city to Jigjiga. President Abdirah-
man and his deputies journeyed to Addis Ababa to become acquainted 
with the federal authorities. The president was interviewed on national 
radio and asked about the transfer of the capital from Godey to Jigjiga. 
He denied that this had occurred, but others contradicted him. The 
Somali federal minister, Hussein, met the president, the secretary, and 
one influential executive committee member. A heated debate ensued 
between the president and the other two. The secretary and the other 
executive committee member, with encouragement from the federal 
minister, impressed on the president that the federal authorities were 
contemplating dividing the Somali Region into at least two provinces 
because of internal political acrimony. The president was startled by 
this news and immediately told his colleagues that the discussion 
should come to an end.41 In the meantime, the federal prime minister 
went to Godey to explain to Somali elders the self-determination pro-
cess as articulated in the constitution.
The agreement between the federal minister and the regional presi-
dent and his deputies to work together for the common good did not 
prevent the president from pushing a sectarian political agenda once 
he returned to Godey.42 Ugas Abdirahman, encouraged by eleven exec-
utive committee members, resisted the official transfer of the capital to 
Jigjiga. Moreover, he tried to halt the national census being conducted 
in the region. This last act infuriated the federal authorities, who asked 
the executive committee to come to Addis Ababa for consultations. 
Prime Minister Zenawi inquired why the Somali Region was not mak-
ing progress. Ugas Abdirahman responded that the region’s troubles 
were the result of interference from people in the federal prime minis-
ter’s office. Other committee members disagreed. The prime minister 
warned the committee that the federal government might have no 
choice but to convene a meeting of elders in the region and inform 
them that their elected officials were not working on their behalf.43 He 
explained that the elders could then decide to fire them all. Premier 
Zenawi warned them that they had one last chance to reform and to 
act responsibly.
The executive committee returned to Jigjiga, fired the entire region’s 
senior employees, and began drawing up job descriptions and quali-
fication for future employees.44 They also dismissed the president in 
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early 1995, when he refused to carry out the decision to transfer the 
capital to Jigjiga. (The capital was subsequently moved to Jigjiga.) 
Political instability characterized the Somali Region during this early 
period of transition in Ethiopia. The principal factors responsible for 
this condition were poor Somali leadership and the absence of dis-
ciplined political organizations that could hold leaders accountable. 
A secondary source of turbulence was federal interventions during 
which some members of the regional parliament were expelled and 
then reinstated to favor a particular political outcome.
IV. A Glimpse of Democracy and Regional Autonomy
The 1995 election marked a new beginning for the Somali Region. A 
better-organized political party with a broader popular base defeated 
the ONLF. The Somali Region became the only province in the country 
in which a governing party was defeated but retained a significant 
number of seats in the regional parliament. Meanwhile, the federal 
leaders tacitly informed the new Somali party who its regional presi-
dent should be. This constituted a major federal intervention that 
would seriously corrode regional autonomy. Despite electoral success, 
internal squabbles induced a major political crisis in 1997. This section 
examines these developments.
As the political struggles noted in the previous section unfolded, 
another Somali political movement was slowly gaining ground. A 
handful of Somalis in Addis Ababa, who were disturbed by the clanist 
thrust of Somali political parties, gathered in 1991 to forge a more 
inclusive Somali organization. They convened a dinner with the bless-
ing of the two Somali vice ministers in the federal government, Abdi 
Adan and Shamsudiin Ahmed. However, their attempt at political 
union fizzled away because of the ONLF’s refusal to compromise.45
In April 1992 some members of the group reconvened and formed 
the Committee of the Whole, with twelve members, each representing 
a political constituency. They elected three committee officers: Suliman 
Ahmed, Abdulaziz Ahmed, and Hassan Fayanbiro, as president, vice 
president, and secretary, respectively. The 1992 regional elections were 
held before the Committee of the Whole made further progress as a 
political party.
The elections marked another setback for the formation of a united 
Somali political coalition. After many meetings and deliberations, 
these groups assembled on 12 February 1994 at the unused military 
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facility in Hurso, on the rail line 26 kilometers west of Dire Dawa. The 
purpose was to form one political party, and participants agreed on a 
broadly representative system reflective of the proportions of various 
groups in the Somali population. The 1,500 delegates who assembled 
in Hurso affirmed the working group’s decisions. Among the many 
decisions endorsed were the party’s name, the Ethiopian Somali Dem-
ocratic League (ESDL), and party colors. The organizing committee 
also nominated Hussein, the federal Somali Minister, as the party’s 
chairman.46 Although Hussein was not a key organizing committee 
member, the delegates unanimously approved the recommendation. 
They also elected Vice Minister Shamshudiin Ahmed as Secretary of 
the party for similar reasons.
The new party had little time or resources to prepare for the 1995 
national and regional elections. It sent a delegation to the Republic of 
Djibouti to solicit financial support from Somali Ethiopians and other 
Somalis. The group was well received and raised over $30,000 and 
obtained several vehicles. The League confronted the ONLF in the 
elections and won nearly two-thirds of the seats in the regional coun-
cil and all seats in the federal chamber. This competition between these 
Somali parties—with contrasting political programs—meant that the Somali 
Region had the most competitive and “democratic” elections in the new ethnic 
federation. The League then formed its central committee. According to 
the League’s founding principles, each major Somali group was to be 
represented by one person in the central committee.47 The first act of 
the new regional parliament was to elect the 21 executive members.
The committee proceeded to elect a president, vice president, sec-
retary, and regional bureau heads. Before the party chose its candi-
dates for these offices, it became apparent that the federal government 
preferred some candidates over others. The League’s vice chairman, 
evidently trying to curry favor with Dawit Johannes, a senior fed-
eral officer, showed the latter a list of individuals who would be the 
region’s new leaders. Johannes informed the vice-chairman that the 
responsibility for selecting regional government heads rested with the 
parliament. However, federal authorities continued to favor particular 
individuals.48 This marked the third major federal intervention in the 
Somali Region’s local political affairs.
Hussein traveled to Jigjiga to participate in the formation of the 
new regional government. He called Eid Dahir and Ali Abdi for con-
sultation49 and told them about the “advice” he had received from the 
federal authorities regarding who should be the region’s president and 
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vice president. President Zenawi preferred Eid Dahir and Ali Abdi to 
lead the government. However, since Ali Abdi had been elected to the 
federal parliament, he could not become vice president.50 Hussein was 
concerned about the federal authorities’ favored list because Eid and 
the minister belonged to the same genealogical group. He was deeply 
worried about the negative political impact Eid’s appointment would 
have on the party and its inclusive agenda. Ali Abdi urged Hussein 
to support Eid for the presidency, given his relatively superior perfor-
mance as secretary in previous governments. The League’s executive 
committee felt compelled to accede to the federal authorities’ “recom-
mendations.” Eid Dahir and Abdillahi Mohamed were elected presi-
dent and vice president. Ahmed Makahiil, who had formerly been 
acting president, refused to transfer authority to the newly elected 
officers and was arrested and later sentenced to seven years in prison.
A party with a more coherent political agenda began to govern the 
region for the first time, and the constant intensive internal competi-
tion for posts that marked previous regional government diminished 
noticeably. The party’s unity enabled the executive committee to put 
into place regional administrative regulations and submit them for 
parliamentary approval. The parliament and the government were act-
ing as partners in the region’s rehabilitation. With technical advice 
from the prime minister’s office, League authorities began to pres-
ent annual recurring and capital budgets to the federal government.51 
As the regional administration became more systematic and account-
able, the budget allocation began to increase. Unfortunately, given the 
region’s limited absorptive capacity, a large portion of these funds was 
unused and reverted to the federal treasury. As the region’s capacity 
to utilize the budget grew, federal advisers, who had the power to 
make final decisions, made it difficult for the region to spend budgeted 
funds.52
The League government also strove to insure that political appoint-
ments to regional bureaus were inclusive of all Somali groups. In 
addition, a categorical decision was made to make all professional 
appointments on merit. The first major sign that the League govern-
ment was serious about professionalizing its administrative and techni-
cal cadre was the mass re-examination of schoolteachers. Teachers who 
wanted to keep their jobs were asked to submit original copies of their 
certificates and take a re-qualification examination in 1996. Unquali-
fied teachers and those who failed the examination were fired. More-
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over, all the phantom teachers disappeared from the payroll. Cleaning 
up the rest of the region’s public services proceeded at a slower pace.
The League administration enjoyed a degree of legitimacy in the 
region, except in the areas where ONLF members or Itihaad held sway. 
The government made some progress in its development program. 
For example, new water wells were drilled in the more arid parts of 
the region. Likewise, a teacher training college and a nurses’ training 
school were established in Jigjiga. Despite these tangible government 
accomplishments, the public remained concerned about the domi-
nance of the TPLF military in the region and its excessive influence.53 
Some government members noted that part of this influence resulted 
from the impotence of some senior regional administrators.54 Most 
individuals had two conflicting views about federal influence. First, 
they approved of the military presence because it prevented the spread 
of the Somali civil war into Region 5. Many noted that if the ONLF had 
come to power without a federal military presence, its agenda would 
have forced most Somalis to resist its clanist rule. Second, the major-
ity of public officials and the general citizenry felt that the EPRDF’s 
interventions in local politics and regional administration undermined 
local development (except when Somalis sought such assistance). The 
vast majority of those interviewed thought that the federal authori-
ties could remove any regional government from power if the latter 
digressed from the EPRDF’s agenda.55
In spite of these limitations, the League government had a rela-
tively long lifespan—two years—in contrast to its predecessors. The 
public thought that the regional government enjoyed EPRDF sup-
port, although the League had not formally joined the EPRDF political 
umbrella. However, the public’s perception was not accurate, as events 
in the summer of 1997 revealed. Serious differences existed between 
the regional president and many of the party’s executive committee 
members, which gradually undermined the League’s unity. Observ-
ers agree that the president failed to delegate authority to his regional 
ministers.56 The gulf between the president and senior party colleagues 
was exposed in 1997 when the League initiated a dialogue with the 
ONLF to explore the prospects of the two parties uniting. Participants 
in this discussion and others noted that the president tried to subvert 
the conversation by acting in contradiction to what the two parties 
had agreed.57 While the dialogue between the League and the ONLF 
was occurring, the EPRDF government had its own secret negotiations 
with the ONLF. The secret nature of the ONLF-EPRDF talks troubled 
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League members, who became convinced that the EPRDF had a differ-
ent agenda than theirs.
The League president’s management style and political behavior 
was reported to the party’s chairman. The chairman informed the 
president of the party’s concerns, but continued to support him. The 
tug-of-war between the president and the party’s executive committee 
persisted. An incident in Jigjiga in autumn 1997 turned the conflict into 
a major political crisis. A guard of the regional police commissioner 
thrashed the director of a regional bureau. Many suspected the police 
commissioner of masterminding the incident since he was at odds with 
the victim. The president of the Somali Region failed to deal with the 
affair until public commotion compelled him to report the event to the 
executive committee. He tried to rush through his decision on the mat-
ter without enough discussion, and the executive committee refused to 
comply until further investigation was conducted. The president then 
left for the city of Harar.
The next day, fourteen executive committee members met. Informed 
of the gathering, the police commissioner sent a contingent of his force 
to surround the building where the meeting was held. The executive 
committee members discussed the president’s authoritarian manage-
ment style. They unanimously agreed, after lengthy deliberations, to 
remove him from office. Two committee members reported this deci-
sion to the League secretary, who was in Jigjiga. Immediately, the sec-
retary informed the party’s chairman, in Addis Ababa, of the events. 
The secretary told the chairman that the group of fourteen requested 
a meeting with him; the chairman gave the secretary the permission 
to hold one. After a meeting with sixteen central committee members, 
the secretary reported to the chairman that the group endorsed the 
president’s removal from office, as it thought that its action would save 
the party and the government from more serious trouble. The chair-
man was not happy with this outcome and considered the group to be 
coup makers.58
The secretary returned to Addis Ababa and met the chairman. Hus-
sein noted that the group of fourteen who had met in Jigjiga did not 
constitute a quorum; consequently, their decision was invalid. He 
immediately called a party meeting to undo the illegal decision. The 
party met in Jigjiga and, contrary to the chair’s wishes, upheld the dis-
missal of the president. The party also censured the group of fourteen 
for not following party rules and recommended that parliament decide 
appropriate sanctions. This set the stage for a major political upheaval.
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V. Farewell to Democracy and Regional Autonomy
The party’s decisions were not implemented, and the federal authori-
ties and the party chairman began to talk publicly about the “coup” 
in the Somali Region. When parliament met, it confirmed the par-
ty’s decision, despite the “illegal” presence of EPRDF representatives. 
EPRDF agents tried to intimidate MPs to change their minds but they 
remained resolute. Moreover, the deployment of a new contingent 
of federal troops in Jigjiga did not frighten members of parliament. 
Parliament refused to lift the fourteen MPs’ parliamentary immunity 
against prosecution until a select committee had completed its investi-
gation.59 Of the fourteen MPs, one realized the EPRDF’s strategy was to 
force parliament to withdraw their immunity so the federal authorities 
could put them behind bars. He spoke bluntly in parliament and then 
quietly slipped out of the country. The federal authorities organized a 
meeting for unelected Somali elders, hand-picked by the federal mili-
tary, to undo the party’s and parliament’s decisions, but the elders 
declined to support the proposition. After much cajoling, parliament 
succumbed to the federal agents’ wishes and the thirteen MPs were 
hauled into detention. They remained in police custody for two-and-a-
half years. Finally, a local court convicted them, but they were released 
from prison immediately, having already served their term. The pre-
siding judge was subsequently demoted for failing to give the prison-
ers a harsher sentence. The fate of this judge confirms that the judiciary 
is tightly controlled by the administration.60
The party’s chairman, backed by the federal authorities, refused to 
heed the democratic wishes of members of the League and parliament. 
His actions plunged the League into a deep crisis. In defiance of the 
EPRDF’s flagrant attempt to manipulate and intimidate members of 
parliament, the League unexpectedly decided to elect the ONLF’s sec-
retary as the chairman of parliament.
The disorder in the League gave the federal authorities the oppor-
tunity to remake the political landscape, by far the most intrusive fed-
eral intervention in the region’s politics. Senior EPRDF cadres were 
assigned to manage the Somali Region’s “reform.” These officials orga-
nized two separate meetings—one for the League and the other for 
the ONLF.61 Shortly thereafter, the federal authorities called for the 
creation of a supreme unification committee. The Deputy Prime Min-
ister of Ethiopia, a key EPRDF member, gave clear instructions that 
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the ONLF would chair the supreme unity committee, and the League 
would occupy deputy-chairmanship.62
The EPRDF went ahead with its plan to unify the two parties.63 
Each party was told to go through self-criticism.64 Senior EPRDF offi-
cials directed this process, a function legitimated when members were 
asked to raise their hand if they wanted EPRDF officials to participate. 
Given the presence of cadres, when this open vote was taken, many 
Somalis in Jigjiga told the author that people were scared to deviate 
from what the authorities wanted.65 A contrived self-criticism involved 
party members admitting to misuse of regional resources.66 The party’s 
chairman was stunned by these admissions as the charade unfolded. 
Those who refused to admit wrongdoing or condemned the process 
were fired. The same process took place in the parallel ONLF meet-
ing. The two parties were then asked to select nine League and eight 
ONLF members to a joint committee that would work on the merger 
of the two parties. Shortly thereafter, the central committees of the 
ONLF and the League met separately and selected 35 people from each 
party to represent them in the merger. The 70 ONLF/League members 
and 150 others brought in to take part in the convention met in Jigjiga 
in June 1998.67 EPRDF officials openly managed these meetings. The 
highlight was the announcement of the formation of a new party, the 
Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP). Neither the League nor the 
ONLF approved the formation of the new party. A faction of ONLF 
re-emerged as a renegade party and claimed that those of its members 
who had joined the new governing party were stooges of the federal 
authorities. By contrast, nearly all former League members who were 
not selected to join the new party were doomed to languish in the 
political wilderness.
The engineering of the new Somali party created unexpected cir-
cumstances at the federal level. The majority of Somali federal parlia-
mentarians (MPs) and many former League members were excluded 
from the new party. Of the original 25 Somali federal MPs, three fled 
the country and sought political asylum. The chairman, who was the 
only Somali minister in the federal system, resigned and took a job 
with the United Nations in Geneva.68 In addition, two MPs claimed to 
be neutral in the shifting political terrain, and three became members 
of the new party. Another was silent about his position. The remaining 
sixteen members constituted the only organized Somali political oppo-
sition to the EPRDF agenda.
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The new party consists of a 25-member Central Committee and 
the nine executive members it elects. The executive committee elected 
the region’s president, deputy president, and secretary.69 Many senior 
regional government and party officials have attended the EPRDF’s 
political education school (Tatiq) in Addis Ababa. Despite these 
attempts to “reform” the party, it remains crisis-ridden, as indicated 
by the struggles between the regional president, his deputy, and the 
party’s executive committee in early 2002.70 The federal authorities 
intervened in the struggle, and at one point removed the president from 
his post only to reinstate him two days later.71 The conflict re-emerged 
in the summer of 2003 and the president was removed from office. This 
federal intervention reaffirms the public’s claim that the Somali party 
has little or no real political autonomy from the EPRDF. Four reasons 
are cited for this claim.
First, senior ruling party officials managed and directed the process 
through which the Somali party was created. This is often contrasted 
with the absence of the EPRDF’s significant strategic participation in 
the League’s establishment. Moreover, the tactics used in abolishing 
the old Somali parties have scared current Somali political leaders and 
convinced them that they serve at the pleasure of the EPRDF bosses. 
They point to EPRDF’s strategic use of unelected elders selected by the 
federal authorities to reverse parliament’s decisions or to cajole that 
body into adopting the ruling party’s agenda as proof of the blatant 
contravention of the regional and federal constitutions.
Second, EPRDF officials, known as regional advisors, openly partic-
ipated in parliamentary deliberations at the highest decision-making 
level in the region, despite the claim that the advisors were serving at 
the regional leaders’ discretion.72 The notion that federal advisors are 
not decision makers may be theoretically valid. However, this is not 
how things worked in practice.73 Numerous regional government offi-
cials and civil servants repeatedly told the author that the advisors had 
intervened in very detailed matters, although “they are not supposed 
to act in this manner.”74
Third, the EPRDF has adroitly managed to frighten the regional 
leadership into submission. When the existing regional parties or indi-
vidual leaders no longer serve the EPRDF’s purpose, it destroys them. 
The regional government’s bizarre behavior in soliciting funds from 
the public for the war effort in 1999–2000 underscores the subservience 
of Somali leaders. Regional authorities required each rural community 
to contribute a specified number of sheep to support Ethiopian troops 
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in the war with Eritrea. Village elders were responsible for collecting 
these “contributions.” Several elders from five villages told me that 
they had no choice but to raise the desired number of sheep, even if the 
villagers resisted. They added that the regional government was mak-
ing these onerous demands just when a severe and prolonged drought 
was devastating the livestock economy.75 The conduct of regional 
authorities in this regard appears to support the proposition that they 
derived their authority from Addis Ababa and were only marginally 
accountable to the Somali population.
Fourth, an item in the SPDP’s program stated that the 1977 Somali-
Ethiopian war was an illegitimate and irridentist Somali attack.76 Very 
few Somalis in the region agreed with this claim. The public surmised 
that this was EPRDF propaganda and claimed that not a single Somali 
had joined the Mengistu army to fight the Western Somali Liberation 
Front and the Somali army.77 Furthermore, they pointed out that a 
similar item condemning the TPLF’s support for Eritrea’s war of libera-
tion should be inserted into the TPLF party program.
The EPRDF waited for the 2000 national elections to get rid of its 
critics. EPRDF and its client Somali party engaged in all kinds of politi-
cal maneuvering to defeat the renegade candidates and to bring com-
pliant MPs into the federal parliament.78 The EPRDF beguiled elders 
in such a way that the opposition would have no chance to compete 
effectively in the election. There were only two instances in which 
the strategy failed. The SPDP nominated candidates for all constitu-
encies. Community leaders in the two areas refused to endorse the 
candidates. Instead, they endorsed sitting MPs who were members of 
ESDL. The leaders of the two communities resisted the pressure since 
one of these two candidates had served his community well during 
the drought and famine, and had earned its respect and support. The 
second candidate stayed in touch with his constituency. The governing 
party realized it would loose in the two areas. Consequently, it decided 
to induct the candidates of the communities into the party without 
their consent. This about-face of the federal authorities and the SPDP 
shows that the only shield that elected regional officials have against 
federal intimidation is to maintain close ties with their constituencies. 
All other renegade candidates lost the election.79 The victory resulted 
in amenable MPs, grateful to the federal authorities, assuming Somali 
parliamentary seats in Addis Ababa. The change signaled the end of an 
era in regional and Ethiopian politics and sealed the slight democratic 
aperture that had permitted a degree of regional autonomy.
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Field observation and extensive interviews support the public’s 
claims that the SPDP is the creation of the EPRDF. The SPDP’s virtual 
collapse through internal political conflict over the region’s population 
census and the list of candidates for the 2000 elections created the fleet-
ing possibility for alternative parties to emerge.80 However, none of the 
rival parties had the resources and EPRDF support to mount a credible 
challenge to the SPDP. Not a single independent or opposition candi-
date won a seat in the federal parliament. In addition, keen observers 
note that the federal authorities were dissatisfied with the regional 
president and orchestrated his replacement sometime before the elec-
tion was held.81
VI. Conclusion
A rationale for reorganizing Ethiopia’s internal administrative division 
along ethnic lines was that it was designed to grant ethnic communities 
regional autonomy to manage local affairs in order to eliminate past 
injustices and enhance the state’s legitimacy. This reasoning is rooted in 
three assumptions: (1) ethnicity per se is the main cause of conflicts; (2) 
ethnic communities are internally homogeneous and share a common 
political agenda; and (3) state inefficiency and illegitimacy are caused 
by the colonization of state institutions by certain ethnic groups. The 
first two assumptions are based on spurious evidence and confuse the 
consequences with the causes of civil strife.82 The last assumption con-
tains important elements of truth in some regions. The validity of the 
circumscribed third assumption means that we should carefully exam-
ine the nature of ethnic domination of a state and its consequences for 
political reform.
A case-by-case evaluation of the political history of particular coun-
ties or regions makes general statements about the links between eth-
nicity, political reform, and regional autonomy tenuous. For example, 
a unified ethnic coalition that defeats the “ethnic state” creates different 
reform possibilities than an ethnic liberation movement that topples the 
old ethnic state. In the first instance, if multiple ethnic groups have 
contributed to the struggle for liberation, it is impossible for one eth-
nic group to control the new national defense force, because all par-
ticipants contributed to the downfall of the old order and thus jointly 
control different segments of the liberation army. Consequently, if no 
single group can claim that it has liberated the country, then no group 
has the unilateral right to set the reform agenda. In such cases, post-
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reform restructuring may factor in ethnicity as an important variable in 
balancing regional and ethnic representation, but in ways that will not 
reproduce old patterns of domination or generate new ones. In con-
trast, if one ethnic group’s liberation movement defeats the old regime, 
then other ethnic groups not represented in the liberation army may 
not have effective ways of keeping the new authority accountable.
The Ethiopian case is one in which a powerful ethnic liberation 
group (TPLF) decisively overthrew the old regime. This has had far-
reaching implications for the balance of power between different ethnic 
groups in the reform era and for the nature of regional autonomy, as 
the Somali case shows. Four EPRDF acts give evidence of the severely 
limited degree of freedom of Somali parties and regional governments, 
and demonstrate the federal ruling party’s pre-eminence. First, the 
selection of the Somali minister in the federal cabinet was the preroga-
tive of the ruling party alone. This may have been appropriate during 
the transitional government of 1991–94, before regional and national 
elections had been held. Once Hussein resigned, however, the Prime 
Minister did not even consult Somali federal MPs when appointing 
his replacement.83 Second, the authorities in Addis Ababa selected the 
first and only League president in the Somali Region. EPRDF leaders 
informed Hussein that they preferred Eid as the regional president. The 
federal authorities’ practice of helping select Somali Region presidents 
has not changed. Current and previous presidents serve at the plea-
sure of the authorities in Addis Ababa.84 Third, the intervention in 
the League’s affairs, the establishment of the SPDP, and the EPRDF’s 
use of non-elected elders to “discipline” the regional parliament to act 
“responsibly” makes a mockery of the federal constitution in word and 
spirit. Finally, the use of advisers in the regions undermines the elected 
regional leaders’ authority. Consequently, the regional authority and 
institutions remain shells rather than developing into autonomous struc-
tures within the federation.
These four examples demonstrate that the TPLF and its umbrella 
political organization, the EPRDF, determined which Somali political 
party and leaders would govern the region. The Somali Region is not 
unique in this regard, as I discovered in my travels in several other 
ethnic regions, such as Oromia, Afar, and the Southern Nationalities 
Region. The repercussions of this centralization of political power are 
that the Somali population has little choice when electing a party and 
government to manage local affairs. The EPRDF has been able to side-
line the Somali population’s voice in the Somali Region because, since 
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the days of the struggle for liberation, the national army has mainly 
consisted of TPLF soldiers. Such an exclusion from the process has 
made Somali leaders susceptible to EPRDF pressure. This vulnerabil-
ity, combined with the incompetence and opportunistic tendencies of 
many Somali political leaders, creates conditions in which these indi-
viduals vie for personal favors from the federal authorities. Further, 
many Somali regional and federal parliamentarians report that they 
fear for their lives if they disagree with federal leaders.85 Five of the 
past seven Somali Region presidents (and many others) have served 
prison terms after they were forced out of office.
The evidence from the Somali Region confirms that Ethiopia consists 
of ethnic provinces that lack the local autonomy that the federal con-
stitution enjoins. When local populations are prevented from electing 
their representatives, a consequential element of regional autonomy 
is lost. This system subverts the prospect of democratic and autono-
mous regional institutional development. The absence of legitimacy 
enhances the role of the security apparatus in maintaining the federa-
tion, and the defense machine is already devouring a major share of 
the country’s meager resources.86
Nevertheless, Ethiopia’s ethnic and decentralized political system, 
despite the EPRDF’S heavy-handed dominance, is undoubtedly an 
advance over the old regime. Ethnic communities enjoy some rights. 
For example, Somalis, who were not recognized as a community in 
the Ethiopian polity, have been acknowledged to be the fourth largest 
population group (some say the third) in the country since 1992.87 The 
official admission of the existence of a Somali Region in Ethiopia con-
tradicts old axioms that Somalis are not stakeholders in the Ethiopian 
state.88 Other benefits include Somali as the regional official language 
and the medium of instruction in primary schools.
These vital gains are in peril as the regime tightens its control over 
regional affairs and thus resuscitates old hostilities. The only way to 
rehabilitate the spirit of the political changes of 1991 is for regional 
communities to gain the freedom to choose their leaders. This case 
study confirms that redrawing the country’s administrative map to 
form ethnic regions cannot reform the ethnically based political injus-
tices of the past. Legitimacy moored in local autonomy and democracy 
alone can seal the fate of the old order and secure a viable federation. 
Conversely, the perpetuation of current trends will deepen ethnic dis-
cord and could undo the federation.
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Finally, it was imperative to tackle the identity question head-on, 
given the “ethnicization” of the state. Restoring the cultural and citi-
zenship rights of the disenfranchised majority was essential for build-
ing an inclusive polity. Dividing Ethiopia into ethnic regions appeared 
to be a reasonable and appropriate vehicle for redressing past griev-
ances while maintaining the unity of the country. However, the power 
imbalance between those who hold authority at the center and regional 
leaders/cultural communities undermined the promise of the new era. 
The evidence suggests that a different ethnic political order is being 
constituted that could create a new state hierarchy, potentially imped-
ing the emergence of civic culture and accountable political order.
The broader implication of the Ethiopian case is that, unless there is 
a legitimate sharing of power, simply reorganizing a country’s admin-
istrative division along ethnic lines is not sufficient to neutralize the 
“ethnicity problem.” The challenge is how to undo previous disenfran-
chisement by enabling local communities to govern their affairs with-
out creating another exclusive centralized authority. The election of 
2005 has been more open than any other election in the country’s his-
tory and the opposition has garnered nearly a third of the parliamen-
tary seats. Somalis in Region 5 have yet to cast their ballots because the 
federal authorities decided to postpone the election until September 
2005. Nationally speaking, the election results provide an opportunity 
to revisit the promise of the early 1990s, celebrate cultural differences, 
acknowledge past ethnically based injustice without reifying ethnic 
politics. Pursuing the latter will deepen the wedge between communi-
ties and induce a new civil war, and it is, moreover, destined to fail.89
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